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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
N I L E N E AFTON ESKELSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
, 13604 
vs
* ( Case No. 
A L L E N C. ESKELSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E N A T U R E 
O F T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from the order made and entered 
in this action by the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 28th day 
of January, 1974, by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
Judge. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Appellant filed an Order to Show Cause, p. 187 
and an Affidavit, p. 176-186 in support thereof and a 
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Motion seeking to require respondent to pay alimony, 
support money and attorney's fees awarded by the court 
to appellant pursuant to hearings had. Judge James S. 
Sawaya sitting as a judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, erroneously found that said orders sought to be 
enforced "were set aside and the issues merged in the 
final decree herein" and as to attorney's fees stated "the 
previous orders merged in the final decree". 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seeks a reversal of said order of the 
District Court merging previous orders and decrees for 
alimony, support money and attorney's fees made by 
the court into the final decree of the court. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint for 
divorce, p. 1. On June 27,1972, an Order to Show Cause 
issued seeking temporary alimony, support money and 
a reasonable attorney's fees. p. 11. 
Pursuant to a hearing before Judge Merrill C. 
Faux on July 19, 1972, plaintiff was awarded by Order 
of court, dated July 20, 1972, $75.00 per month child 
support, $500 per month temporary alimony and $100.-
00 attorney's fees. p. 23. The court on July 28, 1973 
ordered that I M L and I M L Driver's Benefit Fund pay 
over to plaintiff any and all amounts due and to become 
due to defendant until further order of this court, p. 27. 
2 
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Before Judge Emmett L. Brown, judge of said 
court, the divorce action was heard on August 7, 1972, 
p. 36 and the court made and entered on August 9,1972, 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce p. 45 wherein defendant was ordered to pay 
plaintiff the sum of $500.00 per month as alimony, 
$75.00 per month as child support and the sum of 
$300.00 as additional attorney's fees and to be reim-
bursed for her costs, p. 36. Each of the parties was to 
have one-half of the I M L shares, p. 36, 46. There were 
540 shares of I M L stock, p. 46. 
On November 9, 1972, a Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment p. 55 was filed with the court to set 
aside the Decree filed on August 9, 1972 p. 45 together 
with an affidavit which alleged that said Decree had 
been filed on August 11, 1972, when in truth and in fact 
the same had been filed on August 9, 1972 p. 45 and 
more than three months had lapsed since the filing of 
said decree. 
On November 9, 1972, Judge Merrill C. Faux 
made and entered an ex parte Order p. 50 reciting the 
Default Judgment (actually Decree of Divorce) made 
and entered on August 11, 1972, p. 45 (actually August 
9, 1972) which provided: 
". . . that the effective date of the Decree pre-
viously entered in the above matter which was, by 
the terms of the Decree, to become final three 
months after its entry, is hereby vacated and con-
tinued indefinitely, pending further order of this 
Court." p. 50. 
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On January 16, 1973, there was filed with the 
court a Stipulation by and between the respective coun-
sel for the respective parties which provided: 
". . . the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered 
into in this matter on the 9th day of August, 
1972, may become final forthwith as that relates 
to the termination of the marital status between 
plaintiff and defendant." 
" . . . that other than the termination of the mar-
riage relationship between the parties, those 
matters brought up in the defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment and Decree may 
be held in abeyance to be disposed of at the time 
defendant's motion is heard." 
On January 16, 1973, Judge Marcellus K. Snow 
made and entered an Order Terminating the Marriage 
Relationship of Parties p. 60 which reads: 
" 1 . That the Decree of Divorce heretofore en-
tered into in this matter on August 9, 1972, be 
and the same is hereby final at the time of the 
signing of this Order as that relates to the marital 
relationship between the parties hereto thereby 
terminating the marital status between the 
parties." 
"2. Those matters raised by defendant in his 
Motion dated November 9, 1972, relating to ali-
mony, child support and other matters are held 
in abeyance and are not final until the time of 
the hearing of defendant's Motion and an Order 
made in relation thereto." p. 60. 
On March 23, 1973 a Notice of Hearing, p. 65, 
was mailed to counsel for plaintiff, and said Notice was 
4 
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filed with the Court on March 26, 1973, p. 65, calling 
up for hearing the "Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment heretofore entered in the above entitled 
matter." p. 65. Said hearing on said Motion was con-
tinued until April 20, 1973, p. 66 at which time said 
motion was granted by Judge Marcellus K. Snow. p. 67. 
On April 30, 1973, said Order was made and entered 
pursuant thereto and plaintiff was "granted the sum of 
$75.00 as attorneys fees for services rendered in con-
nection with the hearing on Defendant's Motion, p. 74. 
On July 11, 1973, and on July 13, 1973, p. 131, a 
trial was held on the above entitled matter and D. Gary 
Christian, attorney for plaintiff testified as to his fees 
and the matter was taken under advisement. 
On July 16, 1973, p. 132, the court made and 
entered a Memorandum Decision, which provided, inter 
alia: "The $128.00 per month received for the support 
of the minor from Social Security is deemed adequate; 
because of the defendant's disability and meager income 
the plaintiff is awarded only nominal alimony of $1.00 
per year; plaintiff is awarded the home and defendant 
is awarded an equitable lien on same for $4,000.00; and 
plaintiff is awarded $500.00 for attorneys fees, with the 
statement that a reasonable fee for plaintiff's attorney 
would exceed this amount; however, in light of defend-
ant's present circumstances the Court is of the opinion 
that he cannot be subjected to a judgment in excess of 
his present ability to satisfy the same. Said memorandum 
decision was entered by Judge James S. Sawaya. p. 133. 
5 
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On August 27,1973, the Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, and Decree of Divorce prepared by D. 
Gary Christian were signed and filed, p. 135-140. On 
August 27, 1973, the Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 
by said D. Gary Christian was filed with the court, p. 
141. 
On the 17th day of September, 1973, p. 146, de-
fendant made a motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce 
and said motion was granted and said Amended Decree 
provided, inter aha, "That defendant be and he is hereby 
ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of $500.00 for the use 
and benefit of her attorney for representation of plain-
tiff in this matter." The support money for said minor 
child was retained at $128.00 per month, which was the 
sum which had been paid by the Social Security, p. 146. 
On September 17, 1973, defendant filed an Affi-
davit claiming marriage of plaintiff and obtained an 
Order to Show Cause on the 17th day of September, 
1973, which was filed November 19, 1973, and ordering 
plaintiff to show cause why the $4,000.00 was not due 
and owing. On December 6, 1973, a Counter Affidavit 
was filed with the court which set forth the facts of the 
proceedings in this cause since the beginning. Said 
affidavit refers to each exhibit and order and indicates 
that defendant was under obligation to pay to plaintiff 
the sum of $5,496.00 in alimony and support money 
based on the orders o the court, $1,475.00 in attorney's 
fees, or a total of $8,993.50, including the $22.50 in 
court costs, and the total sum received was $3,478.00, 
6 
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leaving a balance due and owing plaintiff by defendant 
of $5,515.50 as of December 6, 1973. p. 150. 
On December 10, 1973, the court denied the Order 
To Show Cause of defendant and ruled that plaintiff 
was "under no obligation to pay to defendant said sum 
of $4,000.00 mentioned in the decree of divorce herein 
at the present time." p. 165. 
On December 20,1973, plaintiff obtained an Order 
to Show Cause, p. 187, why defendant should not be 
found in contempt for having failed to pay the alimony 
and support money ordered; why plaintiff should not 
have judgment for attorneys fees in the sum of $1,475.-
00, in accordance with the orders of the court and costs 
in the sum of $22.50. 
On January 7, 1973, p. 193, a Motion was filed by 
plaintiff requesting judgment against defendant in the 
sum of $4,542.20 in that there is due and owing the sum 
of $500.00 per month alimony for the period of nine 
months or $4,500.00; support money for the period of 
nine months at $75.00 per month or $675.00; four 
months at $128.00 per month or $512.00, and $218.00 
per month for 4.5 months or the sum of $576.00, con-
stituting a total of $1,763.00 in support money; at-
torney's fees in the sums of $100.00, $300.00, $75.00, 
$500.00, and $500.00, or a total of $1,475.00, and costs 
in the sum of $22.50; and one-half of the I M L stock 
having a value of $540.00, or a total of $270.00; constitu-
ting a grand total of $8,020.50, and there has been paid 
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a total of $3,478.00 thereon, leaving a balance due and 
owing of $4,542.20. 
On January 18, 1974, the court made and entered 
a Memorandum Decision, p. 199, which provided: 
1. The support money for said child was reduced 
to $100.00 per month. 
2. "On the questions of whether plaintiff is en-
titled to one-half of the I M L stock, the Court 
finds that the order was contained in the original 
decree which was subsequently set aside and is 
of no force and effect, the final decree containing 
no provision therefore." 
3. "With respect to plaintiff's contention that she 
is entitled to a judgment for arrearage of support 
money and alimony as contained in prior orders 
of the court in this file, the Court finds that these 
orders were set aside and the issues merged in the 
final decree herein. The Court further finds that 
during this period of time the defendant was dis-
abled and unable to financially meet this obliga-
tion and for these reasons the Court rules that 
plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment for ar-
rearage for alimony and support money." 
4. "The Court further finds that on the issue of 
attorney fees, the previous orders merged in the 
final decree and that plaintiff is entitled to the 
award made thereunder of $500.00 together with 
$75.00 awarded her on the hearing setting aside 
the decree and an additional $75.00 for this hear-
ing, or a total of $650.00 attorney's fees." 
From these rulings the plaintiff appeals, 
8 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
Section 80-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by Laws of Utah 1969, at all times herein 
mentioned provided: 
"The decree of divorce shall become absolute at 
the expiration of three months from the entry 
thereof; unless an appeal or other proceedings 
for review are pending, or the court before the 
expiration of said period for sufficient cause 
otherwise orders. The court, upon application or 
on its own motion for good cause shown, shall 
have the authority to waive, alter or extend the 
period of time before the decree shall become 
absolute, but not to exceed six months from the 
signing and entry of the decree." 
On August 9, 1972, the Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed in the 
above entitled action, p. 36. On November 9, 1972, 
counsel for defendant mailed an Affidavit, p. 49 to 
counsel for plaintiff. Said Affidavit p. 49 does not set 
forth any fact or any grounds as a basis to support said 
motion. 
On the same day, November 9, 1972, counsel for 
defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judg-
ment and Notice p. 55 and obtained an exparte Order of 
the court: 
" . . . that the effective date of the Decree pre-
viously entered in the above matter which was, 
by the terms of the Decree, to become final three 
9 
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months after its entry, is hereby vacated and 
continued indefinitely, pending further order of 
this court." 
In the case of Rasmussen v Call, 55 U. 597, 188 p. 
275, this court had occasion to examine a interlocutory 
decree of divorce which had been set aside by a lower 
court without notice to the opposing party. Judge 
Gideon speaking for the unanimous court stated, in part: 
"The effect of the interlocutory decree being to 
vest in plaintiff certain personal and property 
rights, it necessarily follows that the existence of 
those rights denies to any court the authority or 
right to take the same from her, except upon 
legal proceedings in which plaintiff, as the inter-
ested party, has an opportunity to be heard in 
disproof of any attack upon such rights, and to 
establish the fact that she is justly entitled to the 
rights sought to be taken from her." 
"True, in section 3002, supra, proceedings to 
review the decree upon the court's own motion 
are mentioned, but it was not within the contem-
plation of the Legislature that sufficient cause 
could be determined to exist without an oppor-
tunity given to the parties interested to be heard 
in defense of any rights granted by the interlocu-
tory decree. "Sufficient cause" means legal 
cause. To deprive plaintiff of the rights given 
her by the interlocutory decree without notice 
and without opportunity to be heard is not due 
process of law; in fact, it is without any process." 
In Re Harper's Estate, Anderson v. Harper, U. 
2d 296, 265 P.2d 1005, this court considered an ex parte 
order which set aside a decree of divorce because the 
10 
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husband had died after the decree was obtained and 
before the interlocutory period had expired: Judge 
David T. Lewis, speaking for the court stated: 
" . . . However, the occurrence of death does not 
abate the action itself and to the extent that 
property rights are determined by the decree it 
remains effective and becomes final in the same 
manner and at the same time as one between 
living persons." 
"At any time before a decree of divorce becomes 
absolute, the court may, upon its own motion or 
the motion of any person, vacate the decree for 
sufficient cause. This statutory power does not 
allow the court to vacate a decree without legal 
cause nor without giving all persons whose rights 
are involved, an opportunity to be heard. In 
Rasmussen v. Call, 55 Utah 597,188 P. 275, 276, 
this court in considering substantially the same 
statutory "provision stated: (then quoted the 
opinion excerpt heretofore set forth and went on 
to say) : 
" . . . However, to the extend the decisions in 
those cases indicate approval of ex parte orders 
as the basis for vacating divorce decrees affecting 
property rights we expressly overrule the hold-
ings." 
" . . .The order in the divorce case of June 19, 
1950, purporting to vacate the original divorce 
decree, is void and was properly attacked by 
appellant in the instant proceedings. The judg-
ment of the lower court, being based upon the 
void order of the divorce court, is therefore re-
versed . . . . ." 
In the case at bar, the ex parte order vacating and 
continuing indefinitely the interlocutory decree is not 
11 
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only a vacating and continuing of the decree but in 
substance and effect suspending the statute. The decree 
of the court simply cited the wording of the statute and 
the court in an ex parte proceeding was attempting to 
circumvent and thwart the provisions of the statute. 
The order of the court in the ex parte proceedings 
should be declared null and void based on the previous 
decisions of this court and the statutes of the State of 
Utah. 
Based on said rulings of this court, plaintiff is 
entitled to an Order declaring the Order made and 
entered by the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on the 9th 
day of November, 1972, herein declared null and void 
and as of no force or effect. 
A resolving of this point as presented leaves all 
other questions moot. 
. P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N M A K I N G A N D E N -
T E R I N G AN O R D E R TO S E T ASIDE O R D E R S 
M A D E A N D E N T E R E D BY T H E COURT 
R E L A T I V E TO A L I M O N Y A N D S U P P O R T 
M O N E Y W H I C H H A D ACCURED. 
The landmark case and one which has been fol-
lowed in many jurisdiction is Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
105 U. 574,144 P.2d 528. Justice McDonough speaking 
for the unanimous court stated: 
12 
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" . . . the right of the trial court to modify an 
alimony or support money award does not extend 
to installments which have already accrued and 
which are past due, because the right to collect 
such installments becomes vested upon their due 
date. Myers v. Myers, 62 U. 90, 218 P . 123, 30 
P.L.R. 74; Cole v. Cole, 101 U. 355, 122 P.2d 
201. When the right to collect money under the 
terms of a decree has vested, it is not within the 
province of a court to divest such right, unless 
the party who claims the right has acted in such 
a manner as to clearly prejudice the substantial 
rights of the party against whom the right is 
sought to be enforced. 104-42-5 UCA 1943, pro-
vides : 'Whenever an order for the payment of a 
sum of money is made by a court or judge there-
of, pursuant to the provisions of this code, it may 
be enforced by execution in the same manner as 
if it were a judgment' " 
"In Beesly v. Badger, 66 U. 194, 240 P. 458, we 
stated that a decree for the payment of alimony 
operates as a judgment lien as to all past due and 
unpaid installments. Execution therefore may 
issue for the arrearages accumulated within a 
period of eight years. I t is proper for the party 
to apply to the court to have the amount of the 
unpaid installments ascertained, since the statute 
relating to writs of execution require that such 
writs specify the amount actually due and owing. 
104-37-2, U.C.A. 1943. The plaintiff, therefore, 
properly applied to the court for determination 
of the precise amount due and owing for which 
execution should issue; and absent any competent 
facts to establish release, satisfaction, offsets, 
estoppel, or other bases for reduction the amount 
for which execution should issue, plaintiff was 
entitled to an order showing that $7,717.42 was 
13 
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the aggregate amount in arrears within a period 
of 8 years for which execution should issue." 
In the instant case the order for temporary alimony 
and support money and the decree of divorce were for 
the same amount, i. e. $500.00 per month alimony and 
$75.00 per month child support. The order for tempor-
ary alimony and support money was dated July 25, 
1972, and the decree of divorce was dated August 9, 
1972. The hearing date on the order to show cause of 
the plaintiff to determine the sum due and owing was 
January 17, 1974, or a total of 17 months and 23 days. 
17 X 500 equals $8,500.00 and 23/30ths of 500 is 
$383.00 or a total of $8,883.00 alimony accrued. 17 X 
75 equals $1,275.00 and 23/30ths of 75 is $57.50 or a 
total of $1,332.50 accrued child support. This consti-
tutes a total of $10,215.50. The total payments made as 
setforth in the affidavit which was neither contradicted 
or challenged was $3,478.00 p. 183. 
The amount accrued, due and owing as alimony and 
child support at the time of said hearing on January 
17, 1974, was $10,215.50 less the payment of $3,478.00 
or $6,737.50 accrued alimony and support money as of 
January 17,1974, p. 201, the date of the hearing on the 
order to show cause when plaintiff was seeking judg-
ment for the arrearage. 
In the event the court should find that said decree 
of divorce was suspended by the order p. 50 of Judge 
Merrill C. Faux on November 9, 1972, then the orders 
of the court which came into effect for alimony and 
support money accrued would be as follows: 
14 
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The order fixing temporary alimony and support 
money of July 20, 1972, p. 33 provided for said $500.00 
per month alimony and $75.00 per month support 
money; the decree of divorce under date of August 9, 
1972, p. 45 provided for like sums. 
In the Findings of Fact p. 39 and 41, it was found 
that defendant was earning $16,576.00 per year for 
1970 and in excess of $1,100.00 per month p. 39 for the 
first six months of 1972, and that plaintiff was a pre-
school teacher earning $175.00 per month, p. 39. In the 
ex parte Order of Judge Faux on November 9, 1972, 
p. 50 it provided: 
"the effectice of the Decree previously entered 
in the above matter which was, by the terms of 
the Decree, to become final three months after 
its entry, is hereby vacated and continued in-
definitely, pending further order of the court." 
p. 50. 
On January 16, 1973, Judge Marcellus K. Snow 
made and entered an Order, p. 60 (after the decree had 
become final under the previous decisions of this court) 
terminating the marital relationship and as to alimony 
and support money stated: 
"Those matters raised by defendant in his Motion 
dated November 9, 1972, relating to alimony, 
child support and other matters are held in 
abeyance and are not final until the time of the 
hearing on the defendants Motion and an Order 
made in relationship thereto." p. 60. 
On April 20, 1973, Judge Snow made and entered 
a minute entry p. 67 (after the decree had become final 
15 
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under the previous decisions of this court and the six 
months provided by law which provided: 
"Defendant's motion to set aside Decree as to 
alimony and support is granted." The Order p. 74 by 
Judge Snow pursuant to said minute entry was filed 
April 30,1973, and provided: 
" I T IS H E R E B Y O R D E R E D , AD-
J U D G E D AND D E C R E E D that the Defen-
dant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
is granted and that the Defendant shall be en-
titled to answer each of the allegations of the 
original Complaint with the exception of those 
provisions pertaining to the dissolution of "mar-
riage of the parties,. . ." p. 74. 
That is the first order made and entered by the 
court changing or pertaining to alimony and support 
money. From said order for temporary alimony and 
support money of July 25, 1972, p. 33 and decree of 
divorce of August 9, 1972, p. 45 until said minute 
entry of April 25, 1973, p. 67 of Order on April 30, 
1973 p. 74, nine months of alimony and support money. 
9 X 500.00 is $4,500.00 and 9 X 75.00 is $325.00 or a 
total of $4,825.00 in alimony and support money had 
accrued. I t should be noted that in said minute entry 
p. 67 and said order p. 74 by Judge Snow made no pro-
vision as to alimony and support money and the setting 
aside of the decree did not set aside the Order for 
temporary alimony and support money of July 25, 
1972, p. 33 and by the setting aside of said decree it 
would automatically reinstate the temporary alimony 
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and support money, namely the $500.00 per month tem-
porary alimony and $75.00 per month temporary child 
support. The next order or decree of the court affecting 
alimony and support money was August 27,1973, p. 138 
at which time the alimony was changed to $1.00 per 
annum and the child support as noted in the Memoran-
dum Decision of July 16,1973, p. 132 and the Amended 
Decree of Divorce of September 18, 1973, p. 146 in 
each of which the child support was fixed at $128.00 
per month the amount which Social Security was paying 
for the support of said child. I t is therefore contended 
that even though the Order of April 30, 1973, p. 74 set 
aside the alimony and support money allotments that 
the order fixing temporary alimony and support money 
was not set aside by said order and were in fact rein-
stated. Alimony and support money had to be provided 
and the setting aside of the decree would of necessity 
reinstate the temporary alimony and support money. 
Based thereon from July 25, 1972, the date of the order 
fixing temporary alimony and support money p. 30 
until the time of the entry of the decree p. 138 was 13 
months at $500.00 per month is $6,500.00. The child 
support for said 13 months was 13 X 75 is $975.00, or 
a total of $7,475.00 against which there were payments 
of $3,478.00 or $3,988.00 in accrued alimony and sup-
port money. 
On September 18, 1973, the decree p. 146 was 
amended to include child support and it was fixed at 
$128.00 per month and the alimony was retained at one 
dollar per annum. 
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On January 28, 1974, the court made and entered 
the Order p. 202 from which this appeal is taken. Said 
Order provides: 
"2. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff, monthly, for 
the support and maintenance of the minor child, 
a sum equal to the difference between what the 
Plaintiff receives from Social Security and 
$100.00 
"4. The Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment 
for any arrerage of support money or alimony 
alleged in the Affidavits in support of the Plain-
tiff's Order to Show Cause to have been provided 
for in prior Orders of this Court. The Court 
expressly finds that such Orders were set aside 
and that the issues considered and raised in such 
Orders were subsehuently considered and 
merged into the final Decree. The Court further 
finds that the Defendant was, during the period 
that the arrearage for child support and alimony 
is alleged, disable and unable to financially meet 
such obligations. For these reasons the Court 
rules that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a judg-
ment for an arrearage for either alimony or 
support." p. 202. 
As to child support, between the entry of the 
Amended Decree p. 146 on September 18, 1973, and 
the Order, January 28, 1974, p. 202 from which this 
appeal was taken was a period of four months and ten 
days at $128.00 per month is $512.00 for four months 
and one-third of a month or ten days is $42.66 or total 
of $554.66. Credit having been previously given for 
all payments made, this total was accrued child support 
at the time of the Order from which this appeal is taken. 
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It has been held by the Supreme Court of Alabama 
that the inherent power to modify a decree does not per-
mit a retrospective modification which will cancel ar-
rears of alimony. Epps. v. Epps (1929) 218 Ala. 667, 
120 So. 150, of like effect is Sistare v. Sistare (1910) 
218 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 905, 30 S. Ct. 682. In Nelson 
v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri stated that the courts will make no 
modification of the right to accrued installments. The 
wife has a vested right to them enforceable in other 
states on the basis of full faith and credit. Paul v. Paul, 
121 Kan. 88, 245, P. 1022, 46 A L R 1197. 
California courts have held that even though the 
California rule might differ (automatic release of ali-
mony upon marriage) that the California courts will 
give full faith and credit to the Missouri courts where 
there is not the automatic release upon a child reaching 
majority. 
To permit what was attempted in the instant case 
would mean that alimony and support payments ac-
crued or in the future might be attacked each and every 
time that the case is before the court. There would be no 
end to the litigation. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N MAKING 
A N D E N T E R I N G AN ORDER TO S E T ASIDE 
ORDER M A D E AND E N T E R E D BY T H E 
COURT FOR A T T O R N E Y F E E S . 
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In the subject action the court made and entered 
orders as to attorney's fees as follows: 
July 19, 1972 On Order to Show Cause 
p. 33 $100.00 
August 9, 1972 Decree of Divorce (addi-
tional attorney's fees) 
p. 45 300.00 
April 30,1973 Order on Motion of 
Defendant p. 74 75.00 
August 27, 1973 Decree of Divorce p. 138 
Inadequate according 
to Court p. 133 500.00 
September 18,1973 Amended Decree of 
Divorce p. 146 500.00 
Total $1,475.00 
The amount paid by plaintiff pursuant to said 
orders and decrees of court is not of record. Counsel in 
the practice of law do not charge less than the sums 
awarded by the court and clients feel the obligation to 
pay the same and await reimbursement from the oppos-
ing party. In the instant case, the $500.00 awarded on 
September 18, 1973, could certainly be reasonably con-
strued as the same fee awarded in the Decree of Divorce 
of August 27,1973. It is entered only to show that "all" 
fees awarded by prior or decree are entered. 
After parties have been awarded attorney's fees 
which have the effect of judgments, certainly the court, 
without the presents of counsel or hearing thereon, 
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cannot eliminate the fees previously awarded. In the 
instant case, D. Gary Christian had withdrawn as coun-
sel p. 141 with the fees he was to receive determined. 
How can a court, without counsel being present, wash 
out the fees previously awarded based on the services 
performed? Under no stretch of the imagination can 
said attorney fees be for less than $975.00 for the fees 
awarded while counsel was active in the case. Counsel 
fees are in the same class as accrued alimony and support 
money. They are judgments which may be enforced. 
Counsel for the plaintiff has had the obligation of 
taking this matter to this court and the matter should 
be returned for the fixing of the attorney's fees on this 
appeal. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E COURT E R R E D IN S E T T I N G A S I D E 
A D E C R E E OF T H E COURT W H I C H 
A W A R D E D P R O P E R T Y ( O N E - H A L F OF 
I M L STOCK) TO T H E P L A I N T I F F A N D 
W H I C H W A S RECOGNIZED AS H A V I N G 
B E E N A W A R D E D P L A I N T I F F W I T H O U T 
A N Y E V I D E N C E OR CONSIDERATION OF 
T H E M A T T E R . 
In the Decree of Divorce of August 9, 1972, p. 45 
the court stated: 
"8. That the 540 approximate shares owned by 
the parties in the I M L Credit Union are divided 
equally between the parties; 
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In no other place in the proceedings was this matter 
considered yet the court in its order of January 25, 
1974, stated: 
"3. On the question of whether plaintiff is en-
titled to one-half of the I M L stock, the Court 
finds that the order was contained in the original 
decree which was subsequently set aside and is of 
no force of effect, the final decree containing no 
provision therefore." p. 203. 
I t is the contention of the plaintiff that property 
awarded in a decree cannot be taken without due pro-
cess of law pursuant to a hearing after notice. In re 
Harper's Estate, Anderson v. Harper, 1 U 2d 296, 265 
P.2d 1005. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Point I. The Ex Parte Order of Judge Merrill 
C. Faux of November 9, 1972, was null and void be-
cause no notice was given, no hearing was had and the 
order materially deprived the plaintiff of material rights 
without due process of law. Rasmussen v. Call, 55 U. 
597,188 P . 275. In re Harper's Estate 1 U 2d 296, 265 
P.2dl005. 
Point I I . Alimony and support money orders are 
final orders and alimony and support money accrued 
under the same are entitled to full faith and credit in 
sister states and cannot be set aside. Openshaw v. Open-
shaw 105 U. 574, 144 P.2d 528. 
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Point I I I . Attorney fees awarded are final orders 
which are appealable and when the time for appeal has 
run the same cannot be changed or altered. 
Point IV. The award of one-half the stock in the 
I M L Credit Union in the sum of $270.00 was a pro-
perty award and final and not subject to change or 
alteration. In re Harper Estate, 1 U. 2d 296, 265 P.2d 
1005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON AND D U F F I N 
By T. Quentin Cannon 
510 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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